The Phishing Email You Deleted Might Be the One Your Colleague Opens
New UK research suggests many people don’t report scams because they think nothing happened. But that silence can leave somebody else exposed.
You receive a suspicious email. Something about it doesn’t look right, so you delete it and get on with your day.
You’ve avoided the scam. Well done.
But what if the same email has landed in somebody else’s inbox? What if it came from a genuine email account that somebody has compromised? What if the next person to receive it doesn’t recognise the warning signs?
This is something I’ve been thinking about following new research from our partners at Heimdal.
The company surveyed 1,884 UK adults who had experienced a scam attempt during the previous 12 months. Of those, 42.7% hadn’t reported it to their bank, the police or the platform involved.
The reasons are particularly interesting, especially for businesses trying to encourage staff to report suspicious messages.
Most people weren’t too embarrassed to report it
Among those who hadn’t formally reported a scam attempt, Heimdal found that:
- 47.2% hadn’t lost anything, so didn’t think reporting mattered.
- 27.8% didn’t think reporting would make a difference.
- 20.5% didn’t know who to report it to.
- 12.1% thought reporting would be too much hassle.
- 7.2% said they were embarrassed.
Respondents could give more than one reason.
These findings come from a consumer survey, so we shouldn’t assume employees behave in exactly the same way at work. But they raise some important questions about how organisations encourage people to speak up.
For years, the cyber security industry has talked about embarrassment and fear of blame as reasons people don’t report incidents.
Those concerns are real. People can feel awful when they’ve clicked something they shouldn’t have, particularly if they think their actions might affect colleagues or customers.
But Heimdal’s findings suggest that we should also pay more attention to something rather ordinary.
People need to believe reporting is worth their time.
If they’ve already spotted the scam, haven’t lost anything and don’t expect anybody to act on their report, why would they spend another ten minutes filling in a form?
From their point of view, the problem has been dealt with.
From the organisation’s point of view, an opportunity to identify a wider attack may have been missed.
One suspicious email can tell us a lot
I spend a fair amount of time investigating suspicious emails, particularly those targeting schools.
Recently, I’ve been looking at messages sent from genuine school email accounts that appear to have been compromised.
These can be particularly convincing because the sender’s address is familiar. The message might refer to an invoice, a shared document or something that looks like an ordinary part of the working day.
Imagine a School Business Manager at one school receives one of these messages.
They notice something odd, delete it and carry on.
Perfectly understandable. But that email might be the first indication that another school’s account has been compromised. It might have been sent to dozens or even thousands of recipients.
Reporting it gives somebody the opportunity to investigate.
They may be able to identify other recipients, block a malicious link, alert the affected organisation or look for signs that an account has been misused.
The person reporting the email doesn’t need to understand any of that.
They just need to know that passing it on could help somebody else.
A suspicious email doesn’t become unimportant simply because you were clever enough to spot it.
People make decisions based on what happens afterwards
There’s a psychological side to this that I think organisations sometimes overlook.
We learn from the consequences of our actions.
If somebody reports a suspicious message and receives a helpful response, they’re more likely to see the value in reporting another one.
If they hear nothing, get told they’ve wasted somebody’s time or receive a lecture about something they should have noticed, the experience is rather different.
The next time something suspicious arrives, they might simply delete it.
Not because they don’t care about security. They may have learned that reporting creates hassle without achieving anything.
This is why the way managers and IT teams respond is so important.
Even when an email turns out to be genuine, a simple response can make a difference.
“Thanks for checking. We’ve looked into it and the message is legitimate. You were right to ask.”
That takes very little effort, but it tells somebody their judgement was respected.
It also makes asking for help feel normal.
Compare that with a workplace where people are made to feel foolish for raising a concern.
You can have all the security awareness training in the world, but if people are uncomfortable admitting they’re unsure about something, you’re making your own job harder.
We need to stop treating people as the weakest link
I’ve never liked the expression “people are the weakest link”.
It’s particularly unfair when we expect employees to identify every malicious message while criminals deliberately exploit the way people work, communicate and make decisions.
Think about a busy school office.
The phone is ringing, parents are waiting, staff need help, and somebody is trying to deal with an urgent invoice.
Now imagine a message arrives from what appears to be another school, asking them to open a document.
The attacker is exploiting a perfectly normal working situation.
We should provide people with the knowledge and confidence to recognise suspicious activity, but we also need systems that protect them when something gets through.
Good email security, multi-factor authentication, sensible account permissions and monitoring all have a part to play.
Training helps people recognise risks. Technical controls reduce how much we depend on them getting every decision right.
The reporting process should bring those two things together.
When somebody notices something unusual, they should be able to hand it over to someone who can investigate.
Their job isn’t to conduct a forensic examination.
Why the reporting process matters as much as the training
I’ve worked with schools and small organisations for around 20 years, and I know how stretched people can be.
A small charity might have one person handling finance, administration and half a dozen other responsibilities.
A nursery manager might be dealing with parents, staffing and safeguarding matters throughout the day.
In a small business, the owner may be responsible for almost everything.
If reporting a suspicious email means finding an old policy document, locating the right email address and completing a complicated form, people are less likely to do it.
The process needs to fit the organisation.
For some, that could be a reporting button in Outlook. For others, it might be forwarding the message to a known contact or calling their IT provider.
There also needs to be another way to get help if email itself is unavailable or suspected to be compromised.
Importantly, staff shouldn’t have to decide whether something is definitely malicious before reporting it.
“I’m not sure about this. Can you check?” should be enough.
And once they’ve reported it, tell them what happened.
Even a brief acknowledgement helps establish that somebody is listening.
What about people who have clicked?
This is where organisational culture becomes even more important.
It’s one thing to report an email you’ve recognised as suspicious. It’s quite another to admit that you’ve opened an attachment, entered a password or approved a login request.
People may worry about looking incompetent, getting into trouble or being blamed for whatever happens next.
That worry can delay reporting at precisely the moment when a quick response could limit the damage.
Imagine somebody enters their Microsoft 365 password into a convincing phishing page.
If they tell their IT provider immediately, there may be an opportunity to reset credentials, revoke sessions, investigate suspicious sign-ins and contain the incident.
If they wait until the following day because they’re frightened of the reaction, the attacker has had considerably more time.
The first response from a manager should help establish what happened and what needs doing next.
There will be time to review the incident, understand why it happened and improve the safeguards.
Publicly embarrassing somebody or treating an honest mistake as a character flaw won’t make the organisation safer.
A supportive approach doesn’t mean ignoring deliberate misconduct or abandoning accountability. It means dealing with mistakes fairly and concentrating on preventing further harm.
Five things I’d encourage every organisation to do
- Make reporting easy. Give staff one clear way to report suspicious messages, with an alternative contact method if their email account is affected.
- Explain why near misses matter. An email that somebody correctly identifies and avoids can still provide valuable information about a wider campaign.
- Respond positively. Thank people for raising concerns, including those that turn out to be false alarms. Explain the outcome where appropriate.
- Make it safe to admit mistakes. Staff need to know they can report a click or an accidental disclosure promptly without being humiliated.
- Look at what the reports are telling you. Repeated suspicious messages, confusing procedures or a particular type of attack reaching staff may reveal a problem that needs fixing.
For organisations using simulated phishing exercises, I’d also look beyond click rates.
Do staff know how to report a suspicious message? Do they feel comfortable asking for help? Does anybody acknowledge their reports? Are recurring problems being addressed?
Those questions can tell you more about your security culture than a leaderboard showing who clicked a test email.
Silence isn’t necessarily a sign that everything is fine
One of the findings I found most interesting in Heimdal’s research was that more than a quarter of people who didn’t formally report a scam attempt believed reporting wouldn’t make a difference.
That’s a problem organisations can do something about.
If we want people to report suspicious activity, we need to make the process worthwhile, show them that somebody acts on the information and avoid making them feel foolish for speaking up.
The same applies to managers, headteachers and business owners.
If you tell staff to report anything suspicious, you have a responsibility to take those reports seriously.
Because a quiet reporting inbox doesn’t necessarily mean your organisation is safe.
It might mean people have stopped telling you what they’re seeing.
The most useful phishing report could come from somebody who didn’t click anything at all.
And if they’ve taken the trouble to tell you, make sure they know it was worth doing.
Kevin Walker is the founder of Black Swan Cyber Security Solutions in Chesterfield, Derbyshire. With around 30 years’ experience in IT, including approximately 20 years supporting schools, Kevin helps schools, charities and small businesses improve their cyber security through practical protection and a supportive approach to security culture.
Research source: Heimdal Security, Why people don’t report scams, and it’s not embarrassment, published 21 October 2026. The survey was commissioned by Heimdal and conducted by Pollfish between 26 August and 4 October 2026.



